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Review of Persons, Interests, and Justice 
By Nils Holtug* 
Oxford University Press, 2010. x + 356 pp. 
 
The connections between theories of justice and metaphysics have been attracting 
increasing attention over the last decade or so. Work such as Susan Hurley’s Justice, 
Luck, and Knowledge sought to open the ‘black box of responsibility’, which John Rawls 
and luck egalitarians, for contrasting reasons, kept closed. Holtug’s book can be seen as 
peering into the black box of identity, which Rawls sought to close in his later work’s 
explicit sidelining of Kantian metaphysics and which recent egalitarians have barely 
considered. 
This book, like Hurley’s, is split into two parts, with the discussion of justice and 
related issues (such as population ethics) posterior in both logical and organizational 
terms. In the first part, entitled ‘Prudence’, Holtug is primarily concerned with the 
question of ‘what matters in survival in … the prudential sense’. This is the question of 
what ‘gives a person a special concern regarding the person he will be in the future’ (65). 
The commonsense answer to this question is that it is numerical identity – being one and 
the same entity – that matters (58). This suggests ‘that an individual can only have a self-
interest in a benefit befalling someone if she is that someone’ (25-6). But Holtug argues 
that identity is in fact neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for self-interest. 
It is not sufficient because, for instance, it seems to imply, counterintuitively, that 
a foetus has a stronger self-interest in surviving than does a twenty-year-old (27-8). (That 
is, if we assume, as seems plausible regarding the identity view, that the strength of self-
interest depends only on the size of the benefit, and that the value of a life is an additive 
function of its benefits.) And it is not necessary on account of Parfit’s argument 
concerning the results of transplanting two cerebral hemispheres, each containing the full 
psychology of the donor, a, in two recipients, b and c, in one world and only in one 
recipient, b*, in another world. The two main views of identity over time both refer to 
psychological continuity, with one adding a requirement that this continuity has a 
physical basis. As, in the second world, there is psychological continuity with a 
significant physical basis (a cerebral hemisphere), it seems that both views should be 
satisfied that b* is a. But in the first world, though b and c look to be as good candidates 
as b* to (each) be a, they cannot be a according to the identity view, because b and c are 
not the same person. Furthermore, since a stands in the relations that matter to b*, and ‘a 
stands in exactly the same physical and psychological relations to each of b and c, as he 
does to b* … a’s relations to b and c can contain what matters without a being identical 
to (either of) them, and so identity cannot be what matters’ (75). 
While I found the attack on the identity view to be on the whole convincing, there 
are weaknesses in Holtug’s positive view. He suggests that the relation that matters is 
‘Relation M’: ‘[t]he continuous physical realization of a core psychology, and/or a 
distinctive psychology, and/or a chain of distinctive psychology’ (99). I was unconvinced 
by the case for including core psychology, which refers to ordinary human psychological 
capabilities, such as memory and reason (71). The only real argument here concerns 
another of Holtug’s favoured brain-division examples: 
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Suppose that while b will realize only a’s core psychology, c will not even do 
that. … However, before c wakes up, the hemisphere that he has received will be 
rewired such that it comes to realize a new core psychology. Since only b 
continues to realize a’s core psychology, putting yourself in a’s shoes, in all 
likelihood you would want b to have the pleasure and c the torture, and even be 
willing to endure a ten-minute headache in order to secure this distribution (89). 
 
To really test our intuitions here, we should assume, contra Holtug, that the rewiring of 
c’s brain coincidentally leaves it exactly as it started off. We should assume this because 
without such an assumption we might be mislead by non-prudential preferential treatment 
for core psychologies like ours, as when a professor shows special interest in a gifted 
student. We can assume this because Holtug’s claim is not the outright implausible one 
that, where someone just so happens to share your core psychology, they engage your 
prudential concern (97-8). Rather, he requires there to be a causal, physical connection 
between core psychologies for self-interest to apply. If Holtug’s view is right, the absence 
of such a connection should change a case of self-interest into a case without self-interest. 
When we consider the torture being applied to b, who has received your core 
psychology by receiving one of your cerebral hemispheres, and the torture being applied 
to c, who has the same core psychology by chance, I do not believe you have any 
prudential reason to prefer the torture to be applied to c. I can think of no reason why an 
individual would prudentially matter to you just because they, say, acquired your 
photographic memory. Holtug rejects the ‘animalist’ view that what matters is continuity 
of lower brain functions such as metabolism control (73). Yet he does not explain why 
continuity of a core psychology like memory, which is, similarly, a matter of capability 
quite divorced from a person’s distinct character, does matter. As Holtug suggests, it 
would concern me more, prudentially, that someone who has acquired my distinctive 
psychology (such as my beliefs and desires) was being tortured than that someone who 
coincidentally had a distinctive psychology just like mine was being tortured. The first 
individual intuitively includes enough of what it is about me that engages my special 
concern for what affects them to be a matter of my self-interest, whereas the second 
individual is unconnected to me. But our intuitive identification with our core psychology 
is sufficiently weaker that, even if it is continuously physically realized, it need not imply 
self-interest. This is because, when it comes to working out who we prudentially care 
about, our mental capabilities – our ability to remember or to love – do not have the 
importance that our actual memories and loves do. 
 Even if we were to exclude core psychology from our account of the relation that 
matters, the most important implication of Holtug’s overall ‘prudential view’ for morality 
and justice would still hold. As continuity and connectedness of psychology are what 
makes a person have a self-interest in a beneficiary receiving a benefit, Holtug argues 
that that the degree of continuity and connectedness influence the strength of the self-
interest, in the same way that the size of the benefit does (100-4).  
The argument that the relation that matters varies by degrees has a significant 
impact on the scope of morality. Psychological continuity and connectedness typically 
weaken over time, which suggests that, on the prudential view, an individual usually has 
less self-interest in temporally distant benefits than in immediate benefits. This might, for 
instance, imply that an individual’s self-interest lies in consumption, rather than saving, 
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even if saving yields more overall welfare. The long-run benefits of saving have to be 
discounted to the extent that the relation that matters between the beneficiary and the 
current bearer of self-interest is weakened. But from a moral perspective, future benefits 
are as valuable as present ones, so (we can assume) it is morally better that the saving 
strategy is pursued. This suggests that morality is concerned not only with conflicts 
between different individuals’ interests, but also, contrary to a common view, with those 
between the same individuals’ interests (292-5). 
  Much of the second part of the book is concerned with defending a prioritarian 
account of justice, appealing, for instance, to its advantage that it is not subject to 
‘levelling-down’ as egalitarianism is. The prudential view has important implications for 
prioritarianism. Many political philosophers hold that their favoured distributive 
principles compare the advantage levels of whole lives so that, for example, 
prioritarianism prioritizes advantaging those who have low lifetime advantage levels. But 
such a view seems implausible in cases of symmetrical brain division such as that 
discussed earlier, because it refuses to count a’s advantage level when considering how to 
treat b and c, even though what has happened to a matters prudentially to b and c. They 
may have had such a wonderful time in a psychologically continuous and connected past 
life, as it were, that the prioritarian should say they are due very little, given how badly 
things have gone for others. But whole-life prioritarianism refuses to count these morally 
relevant experiences just because a’s life is not b’s or c’s. It is also implausible because it 
refuses to discount benefits on account of decreased continuity and connectedness. It says 
that, in assessing how to treat me now, we just need to know the total amount of 
advantage I have received (and am projected to receive). But if I have received (or will 
receive) this advantage under conditions of brain damage, not sufficient to stop me from 
being a person but sufficient to significantly reduce the psychological link to my current 
self, my lifetime advantage should count for less than that of someone who has much 
fuller continuity and connectedness. Here, as in the case of division, the whole life view 
seems wedded to the identity view, to its detriment (304-6). 
For reasons like these, Holtug proposes an alternative ‘prudential prioritarianism’, 
which accounts, in two ways, for the fact that what matters prudentially varies in degrees. 
First, in appraising self-interest levels, it discounts benefits to the extent that they lack 
psychological continuity and connectedness. Second, in responding to self-interest levels, 
it distributes both benefits and what matters (psychological continuity and connectedness) 
as, for instance, increases in the latter will promote self-interest where they strengthen 
psychological links to the experience of benefits. 
Both Holtug’s critique of the otherwise appealing whole-life approach to temporal 
justice and his prudential prioritarianism seem to me to be along the right lines. But I 
think there is a (yet) more plausible prioritarianism. Holtug’s prioritarianism ‘implies that 
an individual’s level of priority at a particular point in time is a function of how many 
benefits occur in the M-relation that she realizes and how strong this relation is between 
her at that time and at the times the benefits accrue to her’ (309). As I do not think 
Relation M is what matters, I think that any distributive view which builds in reference to 
it is probably mistaken. Yet the most plausible prioritarianism will not simply replace a 
reference to M-relations with a reference to some other specific relation (one excluding 
core psychology, say). That would again give a hostage to fortune. Rather, the most 
plausible prioritarianism will simply refer to what matters, whatever that happens to be. 
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In this way the most plausible prioritarianism will use a thin conception of what matters, 
just as the most plausible luck egalitarianism refers to what Hurley calls ‘thin luck’ – the 
inverse of responsibility, whatever that is. The point of such moves is to ensure that our 
accounts of justice are sensitive to metaphysics, and so have determinate prescriptions 
grounded on the most convincing relevant reasons, without standing or falling with some 
specific theory about something which it is no business of an account of justice to 
resolve. 
There are, then, areas in which I disagree with Holtug. But even (or especially) 
regarding these areas, I have gained from engagement with his views. The book shows 
how the seemingly uncontroversial assumptions about personhood and interest made by 
many philosophers – especially political philosophers – are in fact controversial, and that 
that makes a big difference to how we should think about justice. It is highly 
recommended for advanced postgraduates and professional philosophers with interests in 
justice or personal identity. 
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